Nonconceptualism of Experiential Content Revisited

The debate over whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual has become a fierce issue in contemporary philosophy of mind and perception. The fundamental difference between conceptualists and nonconceptualists is whether the content of perceptual experience is the same as that of cognitive belief. This paper distinguishes the two kind of debates between conceptualism and non-conceptualism on the two levels of possession and constitution, and re-examines three important strategies for defending non-conceptualism - the argument of continuity, systematicity, richness and fineness of grain. Although they all attempt to show that perceptual content is non-conceptual, neither can they be seen as challenge to constructive level of conceptualism nor as complete defeat of conceptualism at the possession level. And there is still no unified explanation basis for what constitutes belief or experience. Therefore, the position that experience is nonconceptual is still untenable.