Abstract: Regarding whether the copyright law should encourage the use of AI to create works, both the affirmative and negative viewpoints take the theory of encouraging creation as the reasoning premise, but the conclusions drawn are not the same. This indicates that the real controversy also exists in the different understandings of the connotations of the basic functional propositions. The meaning of encouraging creation does not lie in artificially generating creation motives or altering one's principles for purposes beyond the law, but in respecting the essence of things as they are and designing rules that match them. Copyright law only needs to maintain the normal operation of the artificial intelligence industry and does not need to add additional incentives to it. Otherwise, it will be impossible to explain either the relationship between the artificial intelligence industry and other industries or the distinction between copyright law and administrative policies, and has a detrimental effect on traditional individual creation. This implies that the analysis of the copyrightability of pure directive AIGC requires a return to doctrinal analysis:The differential treatment of AIGC is essentially an equal treatment based on the characteristics of its creative process. The reason why it is necessary to examine the contribution of machines is that the intervention of machines will weaken the directness of the causal relationship between human creative behavior and creative results. In essence, it is still an examination of human contribution. The complexity of instructions does not necessarily imply the establishment of stable directional relations and originality.