自我意识的结构困难—重审荷尔德林的早期费希特批评（1795）
The Structural Difficulty of the Foundational Self-Consciousness
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摘要: 荷尔德林在1795年的两份文本中，对费希特1794年《全部知识学的基础》中的自我意识理论提出了严厉的批评。荷尔德林认为，费希特的绝对自我无法为意识实在性奠基，并且存在着严重的内在结构困难。费希特本人已经尝试建构一种基于自我活动的绝对主体性理论以规避荷尔德林的指控，但是费希特的绝对主体性仍然未能与意识哲学层面的对象性自我意识拉开存在论意义上的距离。为了避免费希特式意识哲学的内在困境，荷尔德林用存在论层面的绝对存在取代了意识哲学层面的对象性自我意识，将自我意识的深层存在论结构刻画为一种无间隙的本原统一体，重新奠定了绝对主体性的存在论基础，开辟出了先验存在论的全新理论路向。Abstract: In two texts related to each other in 1795, Hölderlin made a serious critique of Fichte’s theory of self-consciousness in the Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre (1794). Hölderlin criticized that Fichte’s concept of the absolute I cannot lay the final foundation for the reality of consciousness, and there are serious internal structural difficulties. Fichte tried to construct a theory of absolute subjectivity based on the self-activity (Ich-Tätigkeit), but his concept of absolute subjectivity failed to keep the ontological distance from the objective self-consciousness in terms of the philosophy of consciousness. Therefore, in order to avoid the inherent dilemma of Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, Hölderlin replaced the objective self-consciousness in terms of the philosophy of consciousness with the absolute being with ontological concerns, depicted the deep ontological structure of self-consciousness as the unity of essence without distance, re-established the ontological foundation of absolute subjectivity, and cast a new light on the transcendental ontology as another alternative of transcendental philosophy.
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Key words:
- Hölderlin /
- Fichte /
- self-consciousness /
- absolute subjectivity /
- transcendental ontology
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