摘要:
《奥义书》是印度传统哲学思想的主要来源,正如《庄子》构成了中国传统哲学思想的主要来源(之一)一样。两者对世界的本质和本原问题即终极实在问题给出了几近相同的答案。《奥义书》作者认为,世界的本质和本原在于梵;庄子认为,世界的本质和本原在于道。两者对梵和道的刻画极其相似。但是,在他们各自归属给梵和道的诸多特点中,存在着严重的不一致之处:梵和道被认为既是天地万物的创造者,又遍在天地万物之中,而且还包容天地万物。通常说来,如果一个事物(作为一个部分或要素)存在于给定的某类事物的全体成员之中,那么它便不可能同时又包容此类事物之全体成员。而且,如果一个事物甲生成了另一个事物乙,那么甲便不可能同时完整地存在于乙之中,更不可能完整地包容乙。如果我们将梵和道理解成世界整体本身或至一,即去掉了任何区分的世界的本然的状态,那么梵和道生成万物的造物者身份与其遍在性和包容性如何融贯一致的问题便迎刃而解了。我们可以通过修正康德和叔本华关于物本身的学说而获得这样的世界整体本身或至一概念。
关键词:
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梵 /
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道 /
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物本身 /
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至一 /
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终极实在
Abstract:
Upanịs ads is the main origin of traditional Indian philosophical thoughts, just as the Zhuangzi is one of the main origins of traditional Chinese philosophical thoughts. Both of them offer almost the same answer for the question of the essence and principle of the world, that is, that of the ultimate reality. According to Upanịs ads, the essence and principle of the world is Brahman; according to the Zhuangzi, the essence and principle of the world is Dao. Their characterizations of Brahman and Dao are very similar. But there are grave inconsistences among the many attributes they ascribe to Brahman and Dao. Brahman and Dao are regarded as the creator of the myriad things in the world, as well as existing in all the things and containing them. However, usually speaking, if one thing exists in all members of a given type of things, then it cannot contain all of them at the same time. Moreover, if one thing generates another thing, then it cannot wholly exist in the latter, nor can it wholly contain it. If we understand Brahman and Dao as the world as a whole in itself or the absolute One, namely, the world without any distinctions, then these inconsistences among the many attributes of Brahman and Dao can be solved altogether. We can get this conception of the world as a whole in itself or the absolute One by means of revising Kant and Schopenhaur's doctrine of things in themselves.
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