从“惯例”到“合作原则”——概述博弈论制度分析的理论建构、现实意义及其局限性

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January 2025

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Citation: FANG Qin. From “Convention” to “the Principle of Co-operation”—— the Theoretical Construction,Practical Significance and Limitations of Game-theoretic Approaches to Institutions[J]. Academic Monthly, 2024, 56(12): 46-62. shu

From “Convention” to “the Principle of Co-operation”—— the Theoretical Construction,Practical Significance and Limitations of Game-theoretic Approaches to Institutions

FANG Qin

Abstract

This article outlines the formation,development,and theoretical characteristics and limitations of game-theoretic approaches to institutions.In the field of contemporary institutional analysis in economics,besides the American Institutionalism (or “Old Institutional Economics”) and New Institutional Economics,there actually exists a third theoretical school,which is easily confused with new institutional economics.This is game-theoretic approaches to institutions.The theoretical core of game-theoretic approaches to institutions emerged in the late 1960s,based on David Lewis’s work Convention.The complete theoretical framework for institutional analysis was later proposed,represented by Robert Sugden’s The Economics of Rights,Co-operation,and Welfare.This article briefly describes the development of game-theoretic approaches to institutions from its inception to its establishment as an indispensable research trend in contemporary economic institutional analysis,focusing on the main ideas,analytical methods,and logical arguments presented in these two seminal works.It also uses currently widely discussed institutional issues,such as the phenomenon of “involution,” institutional inefficiency,and market failure,to illustrate the unique theoretical advantages of game theory institutional analysis compared to other institutional analysis schools.However,the author also points out that due to the limitations of the basic analytical tools—game theory—there are inevitably some limitations when analyzing real-world institutions.These include explaining the “the dilemma of cooperation”,the “evolutionary theory” devolving into “determinism,” and the lack of a systematic theory of institutional change.These limitations also indicate the future development trends of game theory institutional analysis.
- Institutions,Game-theoretic Approaches to Institutions,invisible hand,Convention,the Principle of Co-operation
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From “Convention” to “the Principle of Co-operation”—— the Theoretical Construction,Practical Significance and Limitations of Game-theoretic Approaches to Institutions

FANG Qin

Abstract: This article outlines the formation,development,and theoretical characteristics and limitations of game-theoretic approaches to institutions.In the field of contemporary institutional analysis in economics,besides the American Institutionalism (or “Old Institutional Economics”) and New Institutional Economics,there actually exists a third theoretical school,which is easily confused with new institutional economics.This is game-theoretic approaches to institutions.The theoretical core of game-theoretic approaches to institutions emerged in the late 1960s,based on David Lewis’s work Convention.The complete theoretical framework for institutional analysis was later proposed,represented by Robert Sugden’s The Economics of Rights,Co-operation,and Welfare.This article briefly describes the development of game-theoretic approaches to institutions from its inception to its establishment as an indispensable research trend in contemporary economic institutional analysis,focusing on the main ideas,analytical methods,and logical arguments presented in these two seminal works.It also uses currently widely discussed institutional issues,such as the phenomenon of “involution,” institutional inefficiency,and market failure,to illustrate the unique theoretical advantages of game theory institutional analysis compared to other institutional analysis schools.However,the author also points out that due to the limitations of the basic analytical tools—game theory—there are inevitably some limitations when analyzing real-world institutions.These include explaining the “the dilemma of cooperation”,the “evolutionary theory” devolving into “determinism,” and the lack of a systematic theory of institutional change.These limitations also indicate the future development trends of game theory institutional analysis.

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通讯作者: 陈斌, bchen63@163.com

From “Convention” to “the Principle of Co-operation”—— the Theoretical Construction,Practical Significance and Limitations of Game-theoretic Approaches to Institutions

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