摘要:
慈善组织作为第三次分配的核心载体,其激励与分配效应的发挥有可能使我们在兼顾平等与效率的同时实现共同富裕目标。以2016年《慈善法》对非公募基金会管理费用率的差异化调整为政策背景,并基于2012-2021年中国5140家慈善基金会的非平衡面板数据,构建双重差分模型,可以系统考察薪酬激励对慈善组织效率(捐赠收入)与平等(公益支出)的影响机制。研究发现:(1) 《慈善法》显著提升非公募基金会管理费用率,驱动员工工资福利支出率增长0. 5%,验证了薪酬激励的传导机制;(2) 政策实施后,非公募基金会捐赠收入与公益支出分别增长约15%,反映出这一制度调整在实现效率目标的同时对平等目标的兼容性;(3) 异质性分析表明,上述平等与效率目标的兼容在高社会信任度、高竞争强度的环境中有明显体现,但在低社会信任度、低竞争强度的环境中则没有捐赠收入的明显增加,仅体现为公益支出显著增加。研究结果为慈善领域"平等-效率"的兼容性提供了有力的经验证据,证实适度市场化的激励机制有助于实现慈善组织平等与效率的双重优化,进而为完善第三次分配制度提供理论支撑与政策参考。
Abstract:
As the core vehicle of the third distribution, charity organizations can potentially achieve the goal of common prosperity while balancing equality and efficiency through their incentive and allocation effects. This paper takes the differential adjustment of the management expense ratio of non-public-fundraising foundations by the Charity Law in 2016 as the policy background. Based on the unbalanced panel data of 5, 140 charity foundations in China from 2012 to 2021, a difference-in-differences model is constructed to systematically examine the impact mechanism of compensation incentives on the efficiency (donation income) and equality (public welfare expenditure) of charity organizations. The research findings are as follows: (1) The Charity Law significantly increased the management expense ratio of non-public-fundraising foundations, driving a 0. 5% increase in the staff salary and welfare expenditure ratio, which verifies the transmission mechanism of compensation incentives. (2) After the implementation of the policy, the donation income and public welfare expenditure of non-public-fundraising foundations increased by approximately 15% , reflecting the compatibility of this institutional adjustment with the equality goal while achieving the efficiency goal. (3) The heterogeneity analysis shows that the compatibility of the above-mentioned equality and efficiency goals is evident in environments with high social trust and high competition intensity. However, in environments with low social trust and low competition intensity, there is no significant increase in donation income, and it is only reflected in a significant increase in public welfare expenditure. This study provides strong empirical evidence for the compatibility of “equality-efficiency” in the charity field, confirming that a moderately market-oriented incentive mechanism helps to achieve the dual optimization of equality and efficiency of charity organizations, and thus provides theoretical support and policy references for improving the third-distribution system.
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